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SUMMARY REPORT 
I  Introduction 
This Study, entitled "Adapting the EU Telecommunications Regulatory Framework to 
the  Developing  Multimedia  Environment",  presents  an  analysis  of the  legal  and 
regulatory  issues  surrounding  the  development  of  a  multimedia  market  in  the 
European Union.  In  1995,  that multimedia market was  calculated to  be  worth 812 
billion ECU, as illustrated in Exhibit A below. 1 
EXHIBIT A: 
Services 
Products 
Turnover in the Converging IT,  Telecoms and Broadcasting 
Sectors, 1995 [Source: EITO] 
1995 ECU (billions) 
Distribution (93) 
Infrastructure 
Audio-Visual and 
Publishing 
(200) 
Content 
The beginnings of a multimedia market in the European Union and the United States 
have  become  much  more  visible  with  the  emergence  of the  Internet  and,  more 
particularly, the World-Wide Web ("WWW").  Estimates of the number of Internet 
users world-wide vary between 35  and 60 million, and the Internet market including 
networks  and  services  may  be  worth  100  billion ECU  by  the  year  2000.  Digital 
broadcasting has also been launched during the past year and many players are now 
exploring the delivery of multimedia services over digital broadcast networks. 
1  "Multimedia" is  understood by  the  Study Team to include  information (e.g.,  text,  sound,  fixed  and  moving images  and 
data) made available by the same medium, with which the user can interact.  By  ''interactivity", we mean the ability of the 
user to alter, in real-time, the content he or she receives. Page~ 
EXHIBITB: 
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Elements of  the Multimedia Market [Source:Analysys] 
Multimedia-cavable vlatforms 
• Telecoms 
• Internet 
• Digital broadcast 
Multimedia services 
• Consumer trials e.g. VOD 
• Digital interactive TV 
• Intranet applications 
• Broadcast Internet content 
Multimedia terminals 
• PCs 
•HDTV 
• Hvbrid terminals 
The convergence of the IT,  telecoms,  broadcasting and publishing industries is  also 
driving  the  development  of a  multimedia  market.  Although  convergence  has  been 
taking place for  at least the past fifteen years, the multimedia market has  developed, 
until recently, very slowly.  The explanation for this recent growth lies partly in the 
influence of the  Internet and  partly in the  fact  that convergence  is  taking  place on 
related levels: 
•  At the technological level  where convergence began,  digitalisation has  led to  a 
convergence  in the  ability  of networks  to  transmit all  types  of information.  A 
telecoms  network  now  has  the  ability  to  transmit  broadcast  services  (and  vice 
versa)  and the products of the publishing sector, both audio and visual, can now 
be delivered electronically by a variety of networks.  For example,  some of the 
major record  companies  have  started to  allow  CDs  to  be  downloaded over the 
Internet. 
•  The development of a multimedia market has also been spurred by convergence at 
the market level.  Companies in previously separate markets have recognised the 
need for new skills to take advantage of the access to new markets made possible 
by  technological  convergence.  This  market level  convergence  is  evident  in the 
alliances  and  mergers  that have  recently  taken place,  e.g.  Deutsche  Telekom 's 
investment in Internet telephony supplier VocalTec and Microsoft's take-over of a 
company,  Web TV,  offering Internet via television receivers or its  investment in 
Comcast, the US cable operator. 
•  Technological  and  market  convergence  have  made  convergence  at  the  service 
level possible. This convergence will help create a multimedia market where new ADAPIING THE EU TElECOMS REGL'LATORY FRAMEWORK TO THE DEVELOPING MVL77MEDJA ENVJRONMENT!Swnmnry Report  Page 3 
and  existing  services  can  be  delivered  by  new  means  and  provide  more 
functionality to users. For example, Progressive Networks have recently launched 
a Real Video software which enables video to  be transmitted to  a user on a 28. 8 
kbit/s  modem  in  real-time,  whereas  several  European  digital  broadcast 
companies,  including  Canal Plus and BSkyB, are developing interactive services 
such as home banking as the next stage of development for their digital broadcast 
platforms. 
Convergence  at  the  technological,  market  and  services  levels  need  not  result  in  an 
identical  degree  of regulatory  convergence.  Indeed,  the  theoretical  possibilities  of 
convergence  may  be  counterbalanced  by  a  marketplace  which  is  characterised  by 
divergence  in  terms  of the  range  of services  offered.  Consistency  in  regulation, 
however,  will  have  a  major  impact  on  investment  and  business  planning.  The 
transformation  of today' s  telecoms  regulatory  framework  into  one  which  reflects 
tomorrow's multimedia environment will therefore require a cross-sectoral evaluation 
of the  policies  which underpin existing  regulation  in the  markets  most  immediately 
affected  by  convergence  -- the  telecoms,  broadcasting  and  publishing  sectors.  Our 
"horizontal"  analysis  extends,  wherever  appropriate  parallels  exist,  to  the  IT  sector. 
The lessons  learned in one  sector may  find  application in other sectors,  with certain 
issues  requiring  either  a full  cross-sectoral  response  or at  least one  which  promotes 
parallel approaches across sectors. 
II  Industry Relations and Roles 
The  structure  of the  multimedia  market  is  changing  from  a  series  of vertically 
separate sectors (reflecting both regulation and delivery platforms), each with its own 
separate value chain,  to  a vertically integrated, but horizontally converging market, 
in which  the  barriers  between the  former  sectors  will  disappear.  The  new  value 
chain is  set out in Exhibit C (overleaf),  whilst the positioning of current players in 
the converging market segments is set out in Exhibit D (overleaf). 
Infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, service provision will be the most concentrated 
segments  of the  value  chain.  Margins  will  be  low  in  these  areas  because  of the 
commoditisation of basic infrastructure and connectivity services.  Content provision 
and packaging will provide the highest margins (e.g., Bertelsmann and BSkyB)  and 
many firms  will try to enter these areas.  Barriers to entry for content and packaging 
will initially be low  (e.g., Amazon. com),  and  very  small players may  co-exist with 
large  ones.  Network  operators  are  likely  to  move  up  the  value  chain.  Such 
migration may constrain the growth of the multimedia market if operators abuse their 
monopoly  in  infrastructure  provision  to  prevent  competitors  from  competing  in 
service  provision or packaging.  Within  this  new  value  chain we  believe  that  two 
distinct types of players will emerge, namely:  (i)  service and connectivity providers; 
and (ii) packagers/integrators. 
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EXHIBIT C: The Value Chain in the Mature Multimedia  Market [Source:
Analysysl
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EXHIBIT D: I-ocations of the Major Players in the Value Chain and
Relationship s be tw e en Them I S ourc e : Analy sy s ]
New functions are emerging within each of these new segments, such as information
organisation and navigation by companies like Firefly (a personal information agent)
and Yahoo in the content/information  packaging segment.
The most radical consequence of the development of a multimedia market is the
marginalisation  of monopoly network operators, such as incumbent telecoms
operators (*TOs') and broadcasters,  which before liberalisation exercised  monopoly
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control over access to customers. The success of open networks and delivery
channels  such as the Internet is enabling content providers, packagers and service
providers to access customers directly without any intermediaries. This means that
flows of money in the future multimedia market will be fundamentally different than
they are today. Moreover, content will become increasingly important in the new
emerging market structure.
Exhibit E illustrates the steps which current broadcasters and telecommunications
operators must follow as they attempt to enter the multimedia market.
EXHIBIT E: Telecoms and Broadcasting  Companies'  Steps Towards
Multimedia  I Source : Analysys J
The changing relationships and roles within this multimedia market must be
examined in relation to a number of factors:
.  Multimedia alliances
o Network technologies
.  Evolution of multimedia services and their impact in the home and the workplace
o Pricing of multimedia services, and
.  Standardisation
II.l  MulrnuEDIA ALltlNcrs
The mergers and alliances that have taken place during the 1990s demonstrate  ttrat
industry players believe in the potential of the multimedia market and that market
level convergence  is, in fact, happening.  The volume of such activity has grown
tremendously  over the past three years. In the first six months of 1996, the value of
multimedia  mergers and alliances in Europe quadrupled to 11.5 billion ECU, with
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Internet-related transactions mergers and acquisitions representing approximately half 
of that total. 
In addition to  an  increase  in volume,  there  has  been  another  more  subtle  shift  in 
multimedia merger and  alliance activity  from  within sectors  to  across  sectors  (i.e., 
vertically) within different parts of the value chain.  With this shift, we can infer that 
the motivations behind mergers and alliances have changed.  Horizontal mergers and 
alliances  tended to  be  short term and  opportunistic in outlook,  for  example,  Canal 
Plus and Nethold in cable TV, and the Atlas alliance in telecoms.  Vertical mergers 
and  alliances,  by contrast,  are intended to  exploit the potential of convergence and 
multimedia,  for  example,  America  Online  and  Bertelsmann 's  AOL  Europe  joint 
venture,  and  the  WorldCom-MFS-UUNet  merger.  The  proposed  merger  between 
America Online and CompuServe and the agreement with WorldCom for the handling 
of the merged company's traffic illustrates the increased importance of positioning in 
the  new  multimedia  value  chain.  Additionally,  horizontal  joint  ventures  will  be 
subject to intense pressure to proceed to full merger, particularly in the wake of BT'  s 
bid  to  tum its  Concert  alliance with MCI into  a full  merger,  which has  now  been 
superseded by WorldCom's proposed, and accepted by MCI, takeover. 
11.2  NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES 
Technology  both  in  the  network  and  in  terminals  is  playing  a  key  role  in  the 
development of multimedia  services.  The potential  and  demand  for  such  services, 
however,  are  influencing  different  parts  of the  network  in  different  ways.  The 
principal difference is between the core and the access networks. 
As regards the core and backbone networks, there is some degree of consensus in the 
telecoms and broadcast sectors regarding the technologies that will be used to deliver 
multimedia services.  Moreover, most of the technological problems associated with 
networks which can carry a variety of different service platforms have been solved. 
Development  is  turning  towards  performance  and  quality  of service,  rather  than 
overall  functionality.  There  is  still,  however,  no  certainty  as  to  which  telecoms 
technologies (such as  the Internet Protocol ("IP") and Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(" ATM") transmission) should co-exist with digital cable TV, satellite and terrestrial 
broadcast  networks.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  by  attempts  to  create 
switching  platforms  which  combine  the  benefits  of A  TM  with  the  simplicity  of 
Internet routing by companies such as  Cisco,  3Com and Ipsilon.  In the PSTN, many 
TOs  are  currently  stalling  the  deployment  of A  TM  backbones  and  the  substantial 
amounts of investment that this would entail.  In contrast, capacity is being installed 
at  breakneck  pace  for  the  Internet,  particularly  on  trans-Atlantic  routes,  e.g., ADAPUNG TI]E EU TELECOMS REGUIATORY  FMMEWORK  TO TIIE DEVELOPING  MWUMEDU  ENWRONMENT/Summvw  Rwn Page  7
WorldCom's allocation of half of a planned 20 Gbit/s trans-Atlantic link to Internet
traffic.
In the access network, competition  is becoming more intense in providing access to
multimedia services. In the past two years there have been three significant
developments. Firstly, basic rate ISDN, which provides users with relatively high
rate access to multimedia services, has begun to take off. Secondly, TOs such as
TeleDanmnrk have made major investments  in Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Loop
("ADSL") technology, which is capable of delivering information  at speeds up to
2Mbit/s to subscribers over copper local loops (which comprise the vast majority of
existing TO local access networks). Thirdly, cable TV operators, such as TCI in the
United States with the @home netliuork, are investlng substantial amounts of money
in cable modems which can provide similar capabilities.
Despite uncertainty with regard to market developments  and demffid, interviews and
our analysis suggest that the deployment of key technologies between now and the
year 200.5 will evolve as indicated in Exhibit F.
EXHIBIT F: Projected  Evolution of Technologies Neededfor  the
D ev elopment of Multime dia C apability I S ourc e : Analy,sys/
The trade-off between price and capability will determine which technologies  are
most successful. Exhibit G below shows the current trade-offs for a range of access
technologies. On this evidence, ADSL and cable modems are the leading candidates
to be the high-speed access technologies of the near future.
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EXHIBITG: 
Technology 
Optical fibre 
Satellite 
Cable TV modems 
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Current Annualised Unit Costs and Typical Access Speeds for 
Alternative Technologies [Source: Analysys] 
Unit  Costs  (ECU)  Typical User  Typical Access Speed 
1000-1500  Business and  2Mb  it/  s and above 
residential 
1000-1200  Residential, SME  128-384kbit/s 
500-700  Residential  2Mbit/s to  lOMbit/s 
(one-way) 
400-600  Business  2Mbit/s to 6Mbit/s 
(one-way) 
350-450  Business and  64kbit/s to 128kbit/s 
residential 
100-200  Residential  9. 6kbit/  s to 56kbit/  s 
400-500  Residential/  small  144kbit/s (lonica 
business  proximity claim) 
300-400  Business and  9.6kbit/s 
residential 
11.3  THE EVOLUTION OF MULTIMEDIA SERVICES 
The  growth  of multimedia  services  has  been  characterised  by  "technology  and 
service- push"  from  the  supply-side  resulting  from  the  development  of  new 
technologies such as  the Internet, and by innovation on the part of service providers 
and packagers. 
Although it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty which  applications will 
be  the  most  successful,  some  key  demand  trends  can  be  identified.  There  are 
distinct  differences  between  the  business  and  residential  multimedia  markets. 
Although the residential market is  growing faster than the business market in terms 
of users  (e.g.  growth  from  1995-2000  is  forecast  to  be  four  times  faster  in  the 
residential  market  than  the  business  market),  the  business  multimedia  market  is 
leading the development of multimedia technologies and applications.  For example, 
the  business-to-business  electronic  commerce  (electronic  transactions)  market  is 
estimated at 12 billion ECU in 1996, compared to 600 million ECU for the consumer 
market.  This is attributable to the greater purchasing power and access to high-speed 
connections  and  multimedia  capable  terminals  of the  business  community.  As  a 
consequence,  developers  are  concentrating  on  creating  new  applications  for  the 
business market. There is also a clear trend towards application sharing and company 
information  management  systems  using  multimedia  tools,  particularly  in  the  fast 
developing intranet market.  In the future,  however,  services such as  home banking 
and  retail  electronic  commerce,  which  reduce  the  cost  of services  and  give  users 
__  Analy...sys _____________  r::4u~1-£-. v£~1'9 ff fl~r..wy--
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greater control over purchasing,  should become major multimedia services and help 
close the gap between the residential and business market segments. 
11.4  MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGY IN THE HOME AND WORKPLACE 
Insofar as  terminal equipment is  concerned, multi-purpose terminals such as  the PC 
have had a limited impact on the market.  In general, convergence has been gradual. 
Set-top boxes, however, are being endowed with ever greater computing power and 
PCs  are  capable  of displaying  broadcast  video  and  often possess  communications 
capabilities. 
The  current  penetration  of  multimedia-capable  terminal  equipment  reflects  the 
disparity  in  the  sizes  of the  respective  business  and  residential  markets.  In  the 
business sector, PC usage is fairly widespread in all types of business (though not in 
all  job functions)  and  a  relatively  high  proportion of the  working  population has 
access to the Internet. 
In  the  residential  market,  the  situation  is  different.  PC  penetration  in  Europe 
averaged 24%  in 1995 and low levels of penetration are the largest impediment to the 
development of the  residential  market.  Alternatives  such  as  digital  set-top  boxes, 
multimedia game terminals, and mobile multimedia terminals are all in their infancy. 
Moreover,  multimedia  service  development  is  closely  linked  to  the  demand  for 
multimedia terminals;  the lack of one has  constrained the growth of the other in the 
residential market.  If set-top box costs can be brought down to  a low level,  WWW 
access  via television could be a major factor  in making  the  Internet a mass  market 
service for residential users. 
11.5  PRICING OF MULTIMEDIA SERVICES 
It is  appropriate that,  where markets are competitive,  pricing should be left to  the 
market.  Only  where  there  is  the  potential  for  the  abuse  of market  power  should 
regulation be needed.  At the same time,  in the multimedia market, pricing is likely 
to  require new approaches by  service providers if the widespread take up  of on-line 
and  other services  is  to  be  encouraged.  This is  not just an  issue of absolute price 
levels, but also of the need to take account of the balance between fixed and variable 
price  elements  (e.g.,  the  costs  of equipment  rental,  service  subscription,  service 
usage  charges  and  telecoms  costs).  Over  the  past  twelve  months  many  Internet 
service providers have re-examined their tariff structures in this way.  There has been 
a marked change among  those providers who  previously were the  most expensive. Page 10  Analysys I Sqwre,  Sanders and Dempsev Reponfor the European Commisswn DGXJ!I 
Most  ISPs  now  employ  flat-rate  charging,  and  usage  charges  have  almost 
disappeared. 
The greatest potential for  abuse of market power in pricing is  likely to  arise where 
players are active in different parts of the value chain, particularly where services are 
bundled together. As is true of the Internet, we may see a separation of payments for 
content and/or packaging, connectivity and the delivery mechanism. Alternatively, as 
in the  case of the Microsoft Network,  we  may  see the pricing of content packaging 
and connectivity bundled,  even if the connectivity is  provided by another company. 
Providers  may  also  want  to  bundle  service  and  infrastructure  provision,  terminal 
equipment  and  navigation tools  to  stimulate  the  overall  market,  particularly  in  the 
early life of new services. Cross-subsidisation is clearly an issue of concern, but only 
if profits from a monopoly activity are used to cross-subsidise a competitive activity. 
11.6  STANDARDISATION 
Solutions  already  exist  for  nearly  all  of the  interoperability  problems  which  have 
arisen at the infrastructure level.  The focus  of future  standardisation will  be at  the 
service creation or platform level. 
Standardisation  in  a  multimedia  environment  is  becoming  much  more  oriented  to 
industry-controlled  standards,  e.g.,  through  the  Internet  Engineering  Task  Force, 
rather  than  through  traditional  telecoms  and  broadcasting  standards.  This  is 
particularly  likely  to  be  the  case  in  activities  relating  to  content  and  service 
packaging,  such as  software tools,  which are  characterised by innovation  and  high 
risk (though low cost) investment. 
Regulatory bodies should monitor the development of standards in multimedia, but, 
given the rapid pace of innovation in the industry, there is little scope for  regulators 
to become actively involved in developing standards. The risk is that several leading 
players will launch competing approaches and fragment the market, but this has to be 
balanced against the significant slowdown in the rate of innovation to  which a more 
formal  standardisation process would  lead.  We  believe,  therefore,  that  intervention 
should focus  on resolving  competition issues  such as  the  facilitating  role played by 
OFFEL in securing open access to  the set-top-box specifications used by BSkyB, the 
leading player in the United Kingdom digital television market. ADAPT!li/G THE EU TELECOMS REGUL4TOR}' FR4MEWORK TO THE DEVELOPING l\1UL77MEDIA Etv'V!RONMEJ'{T/Swnmnry Rep011  Page  11 
III  Overview of the Current Regulatory Environment for 
Telecoms and Broadcasting, and Its Impact for Multimedia 
A comparison of national approaches to regulation of the converging sectors, within the 
overall framework  of Community  law,  suggests  five  key  areas  in  which  the  current 
regulatory  environment  creates  potential  barriers  to  the  rapid  development  of  a 
multimedia market: 
•  Conditions for market entry 
•  Regulatory definitions 
•  Conditions for market behaviour 
•  Access to scarce resources 
•  Multiple regulatory bodies 
111.1  CONDITIONS FOR MARKET ENTRY 
For many key players in the multimedia market, particularly those with origins in the 
IT,  software  or  publishing  industries,  strict  rules  controlling  market  entry  or 
governing  market  behaviour  are  anathema.  Nevertheless,  all  Member  States  (and 
Community  legislation)  acknowledge  a continuing  role  for  such  controls  for  both 
telecoms and broadcasting activities. 
The  telecoms  sector is  witnessing  a  radical  shift  from  the  monopoly  provision of 
voice services to open competition across a full range of telecoms services, which is 
being facilitated  by  the  introduction of harmonised licensing principles pursuant to 
the 1997 Licensing Directive.  Licensing in the broadcasting sector is  less open and 
remains regulated primarily at the Member State level, except insofar as  Community 
competition rules may apply or the limited range of content-related issues harmonised 
under the 1989 Television Without Frontiers Directive are at issue. 
•  On  the  basis  of our  empirical  research,  licensing  along  traditional  "vertical" 
sectoral lines displays widespread disparities in the ways in which Member States 
value  and  approach licences.  These disparities  occur both  as  between Member 
States  (within  the  same  sectors)  and  within  Member  States  (across  different 
sectors).  Potential  providers  of  multimedia  services  (especially  on  a  pan-
European basis) therefore face a range of regulatory entry barriers. 
Across sectors, important differences exist in the licensing of voice services, Value 
Added Services, mobile communications services, satellite communications services, 
infrastructure  provision,  and  broadcasting  services  (including  digital  broadcasting 
services). For example, in relation to fees  charged, in Germany:  a national telecoms 
infrastructure licence  can cost up  to  5. 3 million ECU  (total  fees);  a national voice 
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licence  can  cost  up  to  1. 5  million  ECU;  a  typical  private  regional  broadcasting 
licence  may  be  valued  at  10,000  ECU;  the  D2mobile  licence  in Germany  costs  4 
million  ECU  annually  (plus  frequency  fees);  cable  TV  operators  are  subject  to 
individually  negotiated  fees;  and  "multimedia"  services  and  Value  Added  Services 
are not subject to licensing at all. 
The  fragmented  licensing  regime  among  Member  States  is  even more  pronounced 
when one compares regulatory approaches within sectors.  For example: 
•  Voice  services  and infrastructure provision  are  subject  to  detailed  individual 
licensing  requirements in most Member States  (contra  Denmark  and  Finland  at 
present,  and  The  Netherlands  by  1  January  1998,  where  minimal  formalities 
exist). 
•  The licensing of Value Added Services  in Member States displays no  consistent 
pattern.  Near-Video-on-Demand services are regulated as  Value Added Services 
in most Member States, but as broadcasting in France.  Internet Service Providers 
("ISPs") may require no licence in certain Member States,  must satisfy a simple 
authorisation procedure in others (i.e.,  as Value Added Services), and are subject 
to an individual licence requirement in others (e.g., Portugal). 
•  "Multimedia"  service  or  "teleservice ",  a  new  regulatory  category  that  was 
introduced in Germany on 1 August 1997, falls outside the licensing requirements 
of telecoms and broadcasting. This sui generis regulatory category is not reflected 
in the laws of any other Member State. 
•  Mobile  communications  systems  licences  vary  from  Member  State  to  Member 
State  as  to  their  duration and  economic  value.  Member  States  have  also  taken 
differing regulatory approaches to  a number of issues,  such as  the  migration of 
dominant operators  into  neighbouring  sectors,  the extent of permissible vertical 
integration and  the  subsidisation of terminal  equipment.  As  a general  rule,  the 
Scandinavian  countries  have  not  been  concerned  about  pro-competitive 
safeguards, yet both the level of penetration and the level of price competition in 
those countries is the highest in the European Union. 
•  Satellite  communications  systems  which  provide  mobile  personal 
communications  ("MPCS")  are  in  the  process  of  establishing  a  global 
communications  infrastructure.  The  creation  of a  pan-European  system  will 
require licensees to obtain multiple and varied licences except where a system of 
mutual  recognition may  apply (e.g.,  mutual  recognition rules  have  been agreed 
for  certain data  services  provided  by  VSAT  among  the  United  Kingdom,  The 
Netherlands,  Germany, France and Belgium).  It may also be necessary to obtain 
licences at multiple levels (e.g.,  for the operation of the  satellite system,  for the 
access  links which interconnect satellites to terrestrial networks,  and  for  service 
suppliers - who are usually local operators - and for the use of terminals). 
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•  Broadcast networks and services  are  subject  to  a very  broad range  of detailed 
licensing procedures at different levels  (national,  regional and  municipal)  which 
are  characterised  by  a  high  degree  of regulatory  involvement  and  a  lack  of 
uniformity,  in  large  part  due  to  the  relative  importance  of public  interest 
regulation  and  content  controls  in  the  broadcasting  sector.  Moreover,  different 
licensing  requirements  usually  apply  depending  on the  nature  of the  broadcast 
transmission  facility  being  licensed  (e.g.,  cable  TV  and  broadcast  satellites). 
Public broadcasters are rarely treated in the same manner as private broadcasters 
in most  material  respects.  The  licensing  of broadcast networks  and  services  is 
rarely undertaken by the same regulatory authorities responsible for  licensing in 
the  telecoms  sector  (except  for  Finland,  The  Netherlands  and,  most  recently, 
Italy). 
•  Line-of-business  restrictions  are  in  place  in  a  number  of forms  in  different 
Member States, where they are seen as a necessary control on the behaviour of an 
incumbent  telephone  operator  or  as  an  incentive  for  competitive  entry  by 
newcomers  (e.g.,  the  ban  in  the  United  Kingdom  on  BT  providing 
"entertainment services"  over its  telecoms  network until  the  year 2001).  With 
the  exception  of a  number  of Member  States  which,  until  recently  prohibited 
cable TV  operators  from  producing  their own content,  outright line-of-business 
restrictions  are  not  commonplace.  The  territorial  limits  on  most  cable  TV 
franchises  can be  overcome if cable  TV  operators  are  allowed  to  cooperate  or 
merge with one another (e.g.,  Telenet  in Belgium,  C&W Communications  in the 
United  Kingdom).  On  the  other  hand,  media  cross-ownership  rules  are  both 
commonplace and widely divergent in their scope and application both within and 
across different media,  and do  not therefore facilitate convergence across  media 
sectors. 
Recommendations on Market Entry: 
1.  It should be a regulatory priority to ensure that a"light" approach to 
the licensing of multimedia services is adopted. At best,  multimedia 
services should not be subject to licensing requirements. At worst,  they 
should be subject to a simple notification or "class licence" procedure. 
2.  Efforts should be made to harmonise the essential market entry criteria 
for licences across the multimedia sector (especially licence duration 
and licence fees).  In the absence of  such harmonisation, fragmentation of 
the market along national lines is likely to occur; the spread of  pan-
European services may be impeded; and the process of  fixed-mobile 
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3.  In the medium term, a system of mutual recognition by Member States 
of similar regulatory categories of services would be the most 
appropriate regulatory response to the growth of pan-European 
multimedia services.  Of  course,  mutual recognition presupposes a high 
degree of  harmonisation among Member State laws.  Mutual recognition 
would not extend to licences which rely on local rights-of-way or on 
national spectrum allocations. However,  the value of  such scarce resources 
should be appraised in an equivalent manner.  It may be necessary to 
supplement a system of  mutual recognition with an increased level of  self-
regulation by industry members. 
4.  The concentration of certain types of licensing functions in the same 
regulatory body will facilitate convergence ~.g., licensing the provision 
of all transmission facilities and services). A "horizontal" approach to 
regulatory issues cutting across sectors is best achieved if  regulatory 
functions are also concentrated across sectors. 
5.  Line-of-business restrictions should not be extended,as they run 
counter to the phenomenon of convergence. The only justifications for 
line-of-business restrictions in a multimedia world lie in the desire to foster 
new network investments (e.g.,  greenfield cable TV networks) or to prevent 
the leveraging of  market power into new developing product markets (e.g., 
existing GSM operators prevented from bidding for DCS-1800 licences). 
Preventing network operators from engaging in content production,  because 
it denies them the right to enter the most valuable part of  the multimedia 
chain,  raises particular concerns. 
6.  Competition rules can be used on a case-by-case basis to prevent market 
players with market power from stifling competition in the provision of 
alternative distribution media. This can be achieved through a variety of 
regulatory options,  including separate accounting requirements,  structural 
separation,  the promotion of  local loop unbundling and,  in extreme cases, 
divestiture.  The application of  these policy options is very fact-specific. 
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7.  At least a minimum degree of harmonisation of media cross-ownership 
rules is required across the European Union. Current media cross-
ownership rules do not take into account the phenomenon of  convergence. 
Although each Member State is clearly in the best position to judge the 
extent to which pluralism and diversity should be protected consistent with 
its own cultural traditions,  the methodology used to determine whether 
cross-media links are potentially anti-competitive or contrary to pluralism 
should display similar characteristics in a converged environment. 
111.2  REGULATORY DEFINITIONS 
A  key  task  in adapting  the  current  telecoms  regulatory  framework  to  tomorrow's 
multimedia  market  will  be  a  reappraisal  and,  if warranted,  a  realignment  of the 
definitional  boundaries  between  the  "telecoms"  and  "broadcasting"  sectors.  The 
reasons  for  such  a  regulatory  reappraisal  stem  largely  from  the  following 
technological and commercial factors: 
•  The licensing frameworks in all  the Member States of the European Union treat 
mobile,  fixed  and broadcasting communications networks  separately.  Moreover, 
Community  Law  often refers  to  "telecoms networks"  as  the jurisdictional basis 
for its legislative involvement in the sector, which is in turn reflected in virtually 
all  Member State  legal  systems  (a notable exception is  Italy,  where  a telecoms 
network is broadly defined in a Regulation of September 1997 to "encompass any 
switching systems ... "). However, individual delivery platforms, once associated 
with the transmission of a particular type of message or signal, are now capable 
of carrying  all  manner of messages.  As  a consequence,  the  existing  conceptual 
dividing line between "telecoms" and "broadcasting" will no longer be valid in a 
multimedia environment. 
•  Definitional  boundaries  predicated  on  the  distinction  between  ''private" 
(telecoms)  and ''public" (broadcasting)  messages,  which  continue  to  serve  as 
the principal basis upon which all Member States define "broadcasting" services, 
can no  longer be regarded as  foolproof.  The  Internet has blurred the distinction 
between private and public communications and between "one-to-one" and "one-
to-many" communications; the dissemination of communications over the Internet 
is often at the cross-roads of these two forms of communication. 
•  Distinctions based on the essential character of the messages transmitted (e.g. , 
"audio-visual communications", as occurs in France)  are also becoming obsolete 
because,  in a digital  multimedia environment,  it may  be impractical to  separate 
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•  The  physical  equipment  or  technology  used  to  record,  transmit  and  receive 
messages (e.g.,  "television", computers  and CDs)  will  no  longer be  relevant in 
distinguishing  between  telecoms  and  broadcasting  services  because  terminal 
equipment will  become  increasingly multi-purpose.  Consequently,  the  ability  to 
watch programming or listen to  music (or even to  conduct a voice conversation) 
on a computer will be matched by the ability of a television to provide interactive 
entertainment and business needs. 
Both the Community legal order and the  regulatory traditions of the Member States 
distinguish between broadcasting  and  telecoms  by  reference to  one  or more  of the 
foregoing concepts. These concepts, however, are being rendered largely obsolete by 
convergence.  In  a  converged  environment,  we  will  need  to  adopt  regulatory 
definitions  that are not only  sensitive to  technological  convergence but also  accord 
due  weight to  consumer choice in a competitive market,  similar to  (if not identical 
with) the approach taken in Germany under its recently enacted Teleservices Law. 
Recommendations on Regulatory Definitions: 
8.  Current regulatory definitions should be reviewed to ensure a 
consistent, technology-neutral approach to the regulatory framework 
for multimedia and communications services. The obsolescence of 
current regulatory definitions in the face of  convergence requires that 
traditional (and inconsistent) definitions under existing Community law, 
which have been traditionally directed towards sector-specific issues,  be 
reviewed and harmonised. 
9.  A functional approach is required which is both market-oriented and 
best corresponds to the phenomenon of convergence. A regulatory 
distinction might initially be drawn between  "communications" services 
and "broadcasting" services on the basis of  the contractual ("on demand") 
and/or the interactive nature of  the former,  and the scheduled programming 
nature of  the latter.  Moreover,  by initially allowing distinctions between 
communications services and broadcasting activities,  it may allow a more 
gradual adaptation of  the latter to new market conditions.  In the 
alternative,  the maintenance of  the status quo or the development of  a 
concept of "new digital services" or "multimedia services" that coexist with 
the current definitions of  telecoms or broadcasting may be a second best 
option in the long term. 
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10.  In order to promote the flourishing of multimedia services, the concept 
of "broadcasting'' should be interpreted narrowly. The onerous 
licensing conditions usually associated with individual telecoms licences or 
with broadcasting should be limited,  rather than expanded,  in a multimedia 
world. 
111.3  CONDITIONS OF MARKET BEHAVIOUR 
In  a competitive  multimedia  environment,  the  key  operational  issue  for  all  market 
players  will  be  the  terms  and  conditions  pursuant  to  which  they  can  obtain 
interconnection  and  access  to  one  another's  networks  and/or  to  one  another's 
customers.  "Interconnection" is generally understood to mean the physical linking of 
separate  networks.  "Access",  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  broader  concept  which 
embraces the full  range of requests by market players to  obtain access to  a network 
operator's assets or its customers. 
In the telecoms sector, empirical research indicates that the concept of "access" has 
become  blurred  both  under  existing  Community  legal  instruments  and  especially 
under  various  Member  State  laws  (e.g.,  in  Germany,  where  the  concept  of 
interconnection  is  regarded  as  being  a  form  of  "access").  Interconnect  pricing 
follows  the  principles of Community  law,  with regulation acting  as  a surrogate for 
competitive pressures in bringing prices towards cost. 
Existing  discrepancies  in  the  level  of interconnect  charges  among  Member  States 
(e.g.,  traditionally set at significantly lower rates  in countries such as Denmark and 
the  United Kingdom,  as  compared to  other Member States)  are  being  minimised in 
light of the recent prescription of interconnect charges in countries such as  Germany, 
France  and  Spain.  Relying  on Community  legislation,  certain Member  States  have 
also specified that the interconnect charges offered to different operators may differ if 
the  charges  are justified on the  basis  of the  different regulatory  status  of operators 
and/or demonstrable cost savings (e.g.,  The Netherlands,  France  and Belgium).  The 
adoption  of such  a  policy  is  generally  considered  to  favour  the  development  of 
infrastructure-based  competition.  In  addition,  the  harmonised  interconnection  rules 
introduced by the 1997 Interconnection Directive allow, in line with subsidiarity, for 
different  approaches  at  the  Member  State  level  with  respect  to  the  choice  of 
underlying  costing  principles,  and  non-price  issues,  such  as  the  degree  of 
unbundling,  co-location and  so  forth.  For example,  Finland  and  Germany  mandate 
unbundling  down  to  the  level  of  local  loop,  with  most  other  Member  States 
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In the  broadcasting sector,  by  way  of contrast,  the  concept of interconnection has 
been essentially  irrelevant from  a regulatory viewpoint,  with independent networks 
having  direct  access  to  consumers  without  cooperating  with  other  market players 
(unlike the world of telecoms). At the same time, the concept of access has a number 
of regulatory implications, related primarily to the goals of preserving pluralism and 
diversity of choice.  The clearest application of this principle is  reflected in the wide 
variety  of "must-carry"  obligations usually  imposed upon cable  TV  operators  (and 
presumably digital broadcasters in the  near future)  by  the vast majority of Member 
States (with the notable exceptions of Greece and Italy).  More recently, the issue has 
arisen in various Member States whether telecoms-style ONP rules  should apply  so 
as  to  require cable TV operators to  provide satellite TV broadcasters with access to 
their networks (especially in The Netherlands). 
Recommendations on Market Behaviour: 
11.  In the short term, the concepts of"interconnection" and "access" 
should be clearly distinguished, because their respective roles in a 
future multimedia environment are likely to be different. The public 
policy priority behind "interconnection " is to ensure any-to-any 
communications among citizens of  the European  Union.  A concept of 
"access",  on the other hand, potentially refers to a very broad range of 
purely commercial relationships between market players. 
12.  The concept of "access" should embrace all requests by an operator or 
service provider to other network operators and/or service providers 
for access to their resources or to their customers (this would include 
the origination of communications). Requests for commercial access 
should be assessed in the context of  European competition rules,  especially 
in terms of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty or its national equivalents (i.e.,  the 
abuse of  market power). Measures designed to increase transparency will 
assist regulators in the detection of  abusive pricing practices. Requests for 
access based on public policy reasons would fall outside this framework 
because of  their non-economic character. 
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13.  The concept of "interconnection" should be restricted to the 
termination of communications on the network of an operator. Unlike 
the concept of "access",  whose terms should in principle reflect a 
competitive marketplace (i.e.,  a contestable market),  there is an overriding 
public policy goal in mandating that the termination of  communications 
should occur at a price close to cost in order to ensure  "any to any" 
communications.  The policy rationale for such an approach derives from 
the fact that a given telephone number (or even an e-mail address) is a 
unique type of  bottleneck.  To this end,  Community legislation could 
prescribe that termination to a bottleneck be provided on the basis of  cost 
(preferably under a LRAIC formula). 
14.  The use of Article 86 to determine the terms and conditions upon which 
access will be granted may, in the long term, require a determination as 
to what constitutes an "essential" or "bottleneck" facility for access 
purposes.  It may be necessary to provide a statutory definition of  such 
facilities in order to enhance enforcement (as has been done recently in 
Australia). It would be premature to do so,  however,  until the multimedia 
market is given time to mature. 
15.  Until the multimedia market matures further, it would be premature to 
extend the concept of the ONP beyond traditionaltelecoms-related 
areas.  For example,  in the context of  the cable TV industry,  the application 
of  ONP rules to cable TV providers would probably have a negative impact 
on their investment decisions  (i.e.,  it is a low margin business which is 
subject to competition from a variety of  sources,  and it is not characterised 
by a significant degree of  vertical integration in the multimedia value 
chain). Moreover,  the application of  ONP rules has been premised on the 
existence of  a vertically integrated monopoly network provider and,  in a 
liberalised environment,  on the enduring nature of  market power held by 
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16.  Aside from the application of Article 86 on a case-by-case basis, 
mandated access to content should be avoided in the absence of strong 
public policy reasons justifying intervention. Although access on fair 
and reasonable terms may be appropriate for programmes which are 
"perishable" in certain circumstances (i.e.,  of  short commercial life,  such 
as large sporting events),  the ability of  Member States under the revised 
1989 Television Without Frontiers Directive of  30 June 1997 to prevent 
broadcasters from obtaining exclusive access to events of "major 
importance to society " appears to provide adequate protection in the short 
term against the abuse of  market power over content. 
17.  Mandated access to certain types of content may be necessaryin 
exceptional cases of vertical integration by entities which span content 
creation, packaging and distribution functions. The presence of  such a 
vertically integrated entity in a gatekeeping capacity (e.g.,  through the use 
of  a proprietary conditional access system) may be determinative in 
evaluating whether such extreme regulatory action should be taken.  In such 
circumstances, there may be an argument for applying the non-discrimination 
and reasonableness requirement currently used in telecoms sector regulation. 
18.  In a mature multimedia market, "must carry" obligations may no 
longer be necessary. An abundance of  content may mean that such an 
obligation no longer serves the social goal it once sought to satisfy. 
Moreover,  in a world of  multiple digital channels,  carrying other channels 
may become an economic,  rather than a legal,  necessity. 
111.4  ACCESS TO SCARCE RESOURCES 
Notwithstanding the popular belief that digitalisation and compression techniques will 
mean the  end of "scarcity"  as  a reason to  restrict market entry  or subject  market 
players  to  regulatory  supervision,  there  are  many  resources  of both a public  and 
private  nature  whose  scarcity  will  continue  to  impede  the  ability  of all  potential 
players to participate in the multimedia market. 
(a)  Public Resources 
The  use  of  scarce  public  resources,  such  as  rights-of-way  and  frequencies,  1s 
regulated  at  the  Member  State  level,  pursuant  to  general  principles  set  forth  in 
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As  regards rights-of-way, there exist significant practical difficulties both in terms of 
the  delay  and  expense  incurred  by  new  entrants  in obtaining  rights-of-way  across 
public  and private land.  These difficulties  vary significantly from  Member State  to 
Member State and even within Member States themselves (given that they are usually 
administered by  local authorities).  For example,  although the federal  government in 
Germany has  specified that rights-of-way for  telecoms  infrastructure be  available at 
no  cost, local authorities are challenging this  law,  which is  said to  deprive them of 
their legal rights over local property. In The Netherlands, different rules applied until 
recently for public domain regulation depending on whether the public domain was to 
be used: (a) in the "public interest" (e.g., public broadcasters); (b) in cases where its 
use  had  to  be  tolerated  (e.g.,  new  telecoms  licensees  such  as  Telfort  and  Enertel 
which  are  granted  "digging  rights");  and  (c)  for  a  "commercial  activity"  (other 
telecoms licensees,  which are subject to  an annual charge based on the extent of the 
public domain traversed). Only France has adopted a detailed legal regime within the 
context of telecoms  for  the  granting of rights-of-way by  all  local  authorities  within 
prescribed ranges  of fees.  The  provisions  of the  1996 Full  Competition  Directive, 
however,  require  that  rights-of-way  must  be  administered  in  a non-discriminatory 
manner and that physical facilities may need to be shared by competitors. 
Frequencies  are  the  key  scarce  resource  of today' s  telecoms  and  broadcasting 
environments,  and will continue to  be so  in a future  multimedia environment.  Most 
GSM  operators are already experiencing congestion in the  frequency  bands used by 
them  throughout  the  European  Union.  A  number  of countries  such  as  Italy  and 
Ireland have  already  delayed  their  award  of DCS-1800  licences  until  a  system  is 
concluded for  the equitable sharing of spectrum among existing GSM  operators and 
new  DCS-1800 operators.  The inefficient use of important spectrum bands by  civil 
authorities and the armed services in many  Member States continues to  result in the 
uneconomical use of spectrum.  In France,  44.1 % of the 30-960 MHz  band is  used 
for  civil aviation/home affairs/defence purposes,  40.9% for  broadcasting,  and  only 
15%  for  public  telecoms  services.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  public  authorities  are 
outsourcing their telecoms needs in a bid to conserve valuable spectrum. 
Future  multimedia  services  will  require  increasing  amounts  of bandwidth.  This 
suggests that spectrum management will play a crucial role in a multimedia world to 
the extent that such services are delivered in whole or in part by wireless links (e.g. , 
UMTS).  Consequently,  significant regulatory  efforts  will  be needed  to  ensure  that 
frequencies are both allocated and valued in a manner which promotes their efficient 
use.  This will require a fundamental  reappraisal of the traditional "first-come, first-
served" approach to  spectrum allocation. It will also require a reconsideration of the 
current approach of charging administrative fees for spectrum use, to be replaced by 
a more market  -driven approach in valuing frequencies.  Already, Member States such 
as  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Germany  are  re-appraising  their  evaluation 
--(:1  ..  ~'.  c£,n~~ ff ilbnr~Y'------------- Analy_.SY-s __ 
LLP.  · Page~~  Analysys I Squ1rc,  Sanders and Demp5ey Report for the European  Cmmmsswn DGX!Il 
techniques  for  frequencies.  Going  one  step  further,  The  Netherlands  has  been  a 
pioneer in the use  of an open auction method to  determine  the  value  of spectrum. 
Other  countries  such  as  Denmark,  however,  consider  that  access  to  frequencies 
should only be made the subject of an administrative fee. 
Recommendations on Public Resources: 
19.  Rights-of-way over the public domain should be valued in a uniform 
manner. The valuation process should not discriminate as between 
incumbent operators and new entrants  Within the limits set by the 
principle of  subsidiarity, Member States should value the granting of  rights-
of-way in a similar manner.  The timing and the formalities of  such grants 
will clearly fall within the powers of  local authorities. 
20.  Consideration should be given to adopting acoordinated policy for the 
release of bandwidth, currently assigned for certain applications or for 
the use of certain entities, so that it can be used for more efficient or 
higher value activities.  For example,  as certain broadcasters migrate from 
analogue to digital transmissions,  or GSM operators extend their activities 
into new digital technologies,  resulting capacity gains in analogue 
frequencies should benefit other market players. 
21.  Member States should reallocate spectrum to commercial users, 
particularly where cost-effective alternatives are available to 
government users.  The traditional means of  allocating spectrum for 
certain types of  public use such as the military and police have resulted in 
the inefficient use of  bandwidth.  The reallocation of  that bandwidth would 
be facilitated if  it were the subject of  commercial valuation. 
22.  The Member States should be encouraged to establish firm timetables 
for the "ref  arming" of spectrum.  The introduction of  digital 
broadcasting over the course of  1997-1999,  the licensing of  DCS-1800 
systems by the start of  1998 and the introduction of UMTS in 1999 suggests 
that the pressures for a new approach to spectrum refarming will mount 
over the new few years. Accordingly,  it may be necessary for each Member 
State to establish its own timetable for the refarming of  spectrum, 
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23.  Where appropriate, the commercial pricing of spectrum should be 
encouraged to promote its more efficient use in a multimedia 
environment.  There may be situations,  however,  when the importance of 
satisfying universal service obligations,  as well as other public interest and 
consumer interest goals,  suggests that purely commercial approaches are 
not appropriate. 
24.  The accumulation of spectrum which is not used effectively should be 
discouraged by the Member States. In this regard, particular attention 
should be paid to incumbent mobile telecoms operators and broadcasters, 
whose historical access to significant amounts of  bandwidth may no longer 
be justified in a fully competitive market (or,  at least,  access of  such market 
players to future spectrum allocations should be restricted). 
25.  Regulators should take immediate action to review the various spectrum 
sharing options which may be available for UMTS. The inevitable 
movement towards fixed-mobile integration brought about by UMTS may 
require a radical review by Member States of  existing spectrum 
coordination policies.  The promise of  wireless mobility,  coupled with the 
use of  different types of  networks on a pan-European basis,  may require 
spectrum sharing,  rather than today 's system of  technology-specific 
bandwidth allocations. 
(b)  Private Resources 
The ownership of proprietary rights to a key technology by one or a small number of 
entities  may  enable  those  owners  to  act  as  "gatekeepers"  for  other  industry 
participants wishing  to  participate in the  multimedia value  chain.  This  gatekeeping 
function may create what is tantamount to an essential facility or bottleneck that may 
be  used  to  foreclose  competition,  unless  access  to  such  private  resources  is 
administered  in  an  objective,  proportional  and  non-discriminatory  manner.  Most 
Member States are only beginning to  come to  grips with these sorts of issues under 
their  national  legal  regimes.  Particular  "gatekeeping"  functions  which  are  already 
proving to be problematic and likely to be the focus of a future multimedia regulatory 
framework are: 
•  The control of conditional access systems for digital services. 
The ongoing  adoption into  national law of the  1995 Television  Standards Directive 
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for  digital  television  services  throughout  the  European  Union.  The  principal 
regulatory  obligation under the  Directive  is  that decoders  (also  known  as  "set-top 
boxes") must receive and display digital signals,  regardless of whether these signals 
are transmitted by  cable,  satellite,  or terrestrial broadcasters.  Access to  this  set-top 
box must be made available to all broadcasters on the basis of ''fair,  reasonable and 
non-discriminatory" terms. 
Of those  Member  States  which  have  already  implemented  the  Directive  (e.g., 
Sweden,  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Spain  and  Luxembourg),  the 
general  tendency  has  been  to  transpose  the  operative  provisions  of the  Directive 
verbatim  into  national  law.  The  United  Kingdom  has  sought  to  develop  a flexible 
competition-based  approach  in  order to  ensure  the  access  of broadcasters  on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms;  in addition, it has extended its  conditional 
access  regime  to  all  digital  services  (including  multimedia  services).  By  way  of 
contrast,  Spain  initially  mandated  that  a  fully  open  conditional  access  system  be 
adopted.  However,  because such a sweeping  approach denied the owners of set-top 
boxes their proprietary rights over the equipment (which is permitted under the terms 
of the  1995  Directive),  such an approach was  deemed to be contrary to  Community 
rules on the free movement of goods and to  its competition rules. The legislation has 
now been modified to reflect the terms of the Directive. 
Most  Member  States  which  have  addressed  the  issue  have  granted  their  telecoms 
regulatory  authority  responsibility  for  conditional  access  issues  (e.g.,  Spain,  The 
Netherlands,  the United Kingdom;  contra Germany);  other Member States, however, 
have not yet made a definitive decision in this regard. 
•  Directory services in the telecoms field and so-called "navigation" systems or 
Electronic Programme Guides ('EPGs") in the new multimedia market. 
Access  to  directory  services  in  today' s  telecoms  world  and  access  to  navigation 
systems  or EPGs  in the  emerging  multimedia  world present particular competition 
law  concerns;  lessons  learned  in  the  regulation  of the  former  should  serve  as  a 
precedent for the appropriate regulatory response regarding the latter. 
Access to directory services is  governed at the Community level by  ONP principles, 
and  by  competition  law-based  principles  which  characterise  such  services  as 
"essential facilities".  The application of such principles culminated in the resolution 
in 1997  of a longstanding dispute between liT Promedia  and Belgacom  before the 
courts in Belgium  and before the  European Commission's Competition Directorate. 
Aside from the Scandinavian markets and the  United Kingdom,  directory services in 
most Member States have not been opened to any significant degree of competition in 
practice.  In 1996,  France  and  Germany  became  notable  exceptions  to  this  general 
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rule.  Moreover, the prices charged for access to  subscriber information,  even in the 
more  liberalised  Member  States,  is  often  considered  to  be  unreasonable.  The 
approach taken in France to ensure the availability of directory information is to have 
such information administered by  a party which is  independent of all  market actors 
(i.e., a statutory-based "essential facilities" rule). 
Navigation  systems  and  EPGs  are  destined  to  play  a  key  role  in  a  content-rich 
society, because they allow viewers to obtain easy access to information from a broad 
range of available services.  The telecoms regulator in the United Kingdom views the 
control  of EPGs  as  giving  rise  to  the  potential  for  the  restriction  of competition 
between  broadcasters.  Although  envisaging  that  regulatory  solutions  may  need  to 
change over time in the light of market developments, the  United Kingdom regulatory 
regime seeks to promote competition through the following cumulative measures:  (i) 
ensuring  the  independence  and  impartiality  of a comprehensive EPG;  (ii)  ensuring 
equal  access  to  the  underlying  information  in  programme  schedules;  and  (iii) 
encouraging the use of separate EPGs for  the competing programme "bouquets"  of 
broadcasters. 
•  The control of the "inside wire" of telecoms companies in private premises. 
In a majority of Member States, the ownership of the so-called "inside wire" running 
through a residence or business premises resides in the incumbent telecoms operator. 
The ownership of the inside wire vests either by way of an implied covenant (e.g., as 
occurs  in Spain),  by contract (e.g.,  in Belgium) or by  practice (e.g.,  in  Germany). 
The  exceptions  to  this  general  rule  are  the  United Kingdom  and  the  Scandinavian 
countries, where the fullliberalisation of telecoms services has been underway for a 
number of years. 
The  ownership  of inside  wire  by  anyone  other  than  the  householder  or business 
proprietor creates practical hurdles for new market entrants wishing to  obtain direct 
access  to  the  customer,  because  of the  need  to  receive  prior  approval  from  the 
telecoms incumbent before using the wiring. Where the incumbent telecoms operator 
owns  both  the  telephony  and  cable  TV  inside  wire  (e.g.,  as  occurs  in  Germany), 
market foreclosure concerns are magnified. 
•  Other "Gateway" Issues 
"Gateway" issues may also arise with respect to the ownership of intangibles such as 
intellectual property rights.  In the context of multimedia,  these intellectual property 
rights  might  result  in  the  abuse  of a  dominant  position  with  respect  to:  (i)  the 
provision  and  packaging  of  content,  where  market  dominance  resulting  from 
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value  chain;  and  (ii)  private proprietary standards.  There  is  little experience  at  the 
national  level  in dealing  with these  types  of issues.  The  current trend  towards  the 
aggressive use of national competition rules  in the telecoms  sector suggests  that the 
adjudication of such issues will no doubt arise often in the near future. 
Recommendations on Private Resources: 
26.  Competition rules, especially Article 86 of the EC Treaty and its 
national equivalents, provide the most appropriate regulatory vehicle to 
address gatekeeping issues in key parts of the multimedia value chain. 
Clear but flexible rules for the operation of  conditional access systems are 
important in order to ensure platform independence and consumer choice. 
In applying competition rules,  however,  the key regulatory issue will be 
whether the  "relevant market" which is the subject of  the allegedly abusive 
conduct should be confined solely to the  "gateway " equipment or software 
itself (or whether it should embrace a broader notion of  a relevant market 
based on the relationship of  the affected parties to the  "gateway "). 
27.  In the context of conditional access systems  ~.g., set-top boxes), 
competition law concerns are most pronounced where the party acting 
as gatekeeper is vertically integrated, especially in terms of both the 
acquisition and  distribution of content. Regulation must balance the 
rights to receive a return on investment and innovation with the need to 
avoid bottlenecks. In such situations,  an initial regulatory desire to promote 
investment in set-top boxes  by allowing the use of  proprietary systems  (and 
possibly a degree of  equipment subsidisation) may need to give way to a 
system of  common interfaces in the event of  market failure. 
28.  As the multimedia market matures, the resolution of"gatekeeping" 
issues may require a more ex ante competition law approach. Later 
generation gatekeeping concerns may need to be resolved by means of 
specific legal instruments such as Block Exemption Regulations or statutory 
definitions of  an  "essential facility" or "bottleneck",  which would ensure 
that navigation systems (such as EPGs) are used in a competitively neutral 
manner. 
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111.5  CONVERGENCE OF REGULATORY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
There  is  currently  a  highly  fragmented  and  inconsistent  pattern  of  regulatory 
responsibilities  among  the  Member  States  for  telecoms,  broadcasting  and  publishing 
matters.  This  regulatory  fragmentation  is  particularly  prevalent  in  the  broadcasting 
sector, where the importance of a wide range of content-related issues adds  a number 
of regulatory layers not found in the telecoms  sector.  This pattern of regulation is  ill-
suited to the multimedia environment.  Recent actions by a number of Member States, 
however,  indicate  a  recognition  that  converged  services  should  be  regulated  in  a 
common or at least a consistent manner.  In particular, the resolution of jurisdictional 
disputes  regarding  the  enforcement  of regulatory  policy  with  respect  to  conditional 
access  issues  is  bringing  into  sharp  focus  the  need  for  some  degree  of regulatory 
overlap or convergence. 
Both Finland and The Netherlands,  for example, regulate the licensing of infrastructure 
across  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting  sectors  through  a  single  regulatory  body. 
Similarly,  most  Member  States  regulate  frequency  allocations  in  the  telecoms  and 
broadcasting sectors through the same regulatory body.  In the  summer of 1997, Italy 
created a single regulatory body with responsibility for  all telecoms  and broadcasting 
matters.  A  similar approach  is  currently  being  considered by  the  government in the 
United Kingdom for all regulatory matters of an economic nature (i.e. , the creation of 
"OFCOM", possibly by 1999). 
Most telecoms regulatory authorities have distinct regulatory powers which fall short of 
the implementation of general competition rules on a sector specific basis (e.g.  France, 
Germany,  Sweden).  The application of competition rules to  the  broadcasting sector is 
more complicated,  given that cross-media ownership  restrictions  are directed toward 
the  protection  of pluralism,  rather  than  the  preservation  of an  abstract  notion  of 
"competition". 
Recommendations on Regulatory Functions and Responsibilities: 
29.  Common, or at least consistent, regulation across industry sectors will 
assist convergence.  Regulatory convergence can and should occur with 
respect to licensing,  the allocation of  scarce resources and conditional access 
issues. All of  these matters are,  broadly speaking,  matters of "economic" 
regulation; as such,  they do not involve any significant degree of ''public 
interest" analysis,  nor do they raise any particular country-specific concerns. 
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30.  Regulatory issues of a non-economic nature, which often directly reflect 
national cultural identity and specific  public  interest objectives (.g., 
guaranteeing universal service), may not need to be subject to as strong 
a  degree  of  regulatory  convergence  as  areas  relating  to  economic 
objectives.  This  holds  true  both  for  the  regulation  itself and  for  the 
possible reshaping of  bodies responsible for applying such rules. 
31.  A liberalised multimedia marketplace requires the oversight of 
independent regulators. The creation of  a competitive marketplace is 
accompanied by an even greater need for the creation of  a truly independent 
regulator.  This stems from the fact that regulation is itself shifting from the 
regulation of  a monopolist to the regulation of  an open market.  Consequently, 
regulators in the broadcasting sector should in principle be as independent as 
their telecoms counterparts. 
32.  Competition rules should continue to be enforced by the general 
competition authorities, rather than by sector-specific regulators. There 
is an important public policy interest in avoiding the unnecessary 
concentration of  regulatory power. Moreover,  in the absence of  the 
development of  a multimedia  "sector" at some point in time,  there is no single 
regulator which can claim to be wholly responsible for economic activities 
affecting the consistent application of  competition rules across all sectors. 
IV  Emerging Issues and Regulatory Challenges in a Multimedia 
Environment 
Our empirical research of the technological, market and regulatory drivers shaping the 
multimedia environment has  led us  to  a series  of working  assumptions  regarding the 
general structure of a future telecoms regulatory framework. 
IV.l  THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATION 
Important  policy  goals  which  should  shape  any  future  multimedia  regulatory 
environment include: 
33.  The need to adopt a "light" regulatory touch in order to facilitate the 
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34.  The recognition that proportionality will be a key tool in assessing the need 
for and effectiveness of regulation  to achieve defined objectives. The level 
of market convergence may differ from the degree of technological 
convergence, and the need for regulatory convergence may be different 
again. 
35.  The need to adapt existing regulatory instruments, rather than creating new 
ones. 
36.  The targeting of any future legislation to those parts of the multimedia value 
chain most susceptible to the abuse of market power, especially with respect 
to "bottleneck" facilities and services. 
37.  The overriding importance of competition policy in a liberalised multimedia 
environment. However, reliance on competition policy should not be at the 
expense of a targeted ex ante sector-specific framework where enduring 
bottlenecks are likely to arise. 
38.  The importance of defining "markets" for competition law purposes in novel 
ways. This will probably require a re-evaluation of the existing "essential 
facilities" doctrine, of traditional demand and supply side notions of 
"substitutable" products and services, and the possible adoption of a United 
States-style "innovation markets" approach. 
39.  The recognition that vertical integration is an inevitable and often positive 
consequence of convergence, which will in many cases lead to the creation of 
economies of scope and the provision of consumer benefits. There must be, 
however, effective ways to ensure that a market player's involvement in 
multiple layers of the multimedia value chain does not stifle competition. 
Intervention on a case-by-case basis may need to give way over time to 
targeted regulation in the event of market failures, possibly in the form of 
Block Exemption Regulations which introduce transparency into the dealings 
of integrated market actors with other market actors. 
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40.  The re-evaluation of spectrum scarcity as the basis for regulation, 
particularly of free-to-air and satellite broadcasters, in light of the fact that a 
digital environment now expands the capacity of the airwaves to permit the 
carriage of broadband data or the delivery of hundreds of channels of audio-
visual programming. 
41.  The importance of adapting today'  s "vertical" approach to regulation,  often 
linked  to  particular  technologies,  to  accommodate  a  technological  and 
commercial  reality  that  is  blurring  rigid  segmentation.  This  is  likely  to 
require  a  shift  to  a  "horizontal"  regulatory  framework,  organised  along 
cross-sectoral lines. 
This will inevitably lead to the conclusions that: 
the  existing  regulatory  definitions  which  set  the  boundaries  of 
"telecommunications" and "broadcasting" must be re-appraised; and 
the  convergence of regulatory  functions  and responsibilities  may  play  a 
key role in easing entry into a multimedia environment. 
42.  Public interest regulation will continue to be a key component of any future 
regulatory framework, especially as it relates to broadcasting and content 
issues. National cultural traditions, the role of communications in a 
democratic society and the goal of pluralism must be accorded their rightful 
role in a future regulatory framework. Rules, however, must take account of 
market and technological realities, including the ability in the case of new 
delivery platforms, of intermediaries to exercise control over the information 
and content accessed via their networks or services. 
IV.2  THE CONDITIONS FOR OPERATING IN A MULTIMEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
New market entry in a future multimedia environment will require, at a minimum, that 
the following issues be addressed: 
43.  The creation of appropriate conditions for market entry in terms of licensing 
requirements, especially in terms of the duration of licences and their 
valuation. Ideally, a system of mutual recognition of licences should be 
adopted to the greatest extent possible, supplemented by self-regulation by 
industry members. 
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44.  The shift away from the narrow vertical segmentation of markets and market 
actors requires a fundamental re-appraisal of approaches which restrict 
market entry to certain players, apply structural safeguards or impose line-of-
business restrictions. These types of restrictions should not be expanded in 
a marketplace characterised by convergence, and must be balanced against 
the objectives sought. 
45.  The development of workable rules governing "interconnection" and 
"access" which reflect the different roles which those concepts play in a 
multimedia environment. 
46.  The encouragement of greater flexibility and innovation in pricing by 
market players. Regulation should recognise that, for most services, prices 
should be market-led (rather than subject to regulatory obligations such as 
cost  -orientation or affordability), whilst bundling should be seen as an 
important feature of new service strategies. The Internet is further disrupting 
traditional pricing models, which may tend increasingly towards capacity-
based charges or flat-rate "access" fees for transmission and services in the 
future. 
47.  The gradual erosion in a content-rich world of the distinction between 
operators with a "public mission" and other market players, and the gradual 
symmetrical treatment of all players in the multimedia marketplace. Future 
regulation of public broadcasters should move away from treating them as the 
only operators with a public mission. 
48.  The shift in emphasis in the role of the State from a regulator of content in a 
restrictive regulatory environment to a commissioner of content in a fully 
liberalised environment (e.g. , in order to support the provision of "public 
service" goods or services). 
49.  The implementation of strong transparency rules and accounting 
separation requirements to prevent anti-competitive practices such as cross-
subsidisation and discrimination by entities with significant market power. 
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The application of competition rules should be overlaid upon all three tiers of
regulation outlined above.
Insofar as public policy issues might be considered  to continue to play a role in the
first two tiers of our proposed regulatory model, their importance is likely to be
relatively minor; accordingly, a proportionate  regulatory response may need to be
adopted in the application of public policy regulation to the first two tiers of
regulation.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P.
Analysys Ltd.
January 1998
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